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Abstract
Over the past two decades there has been a burgeoning interest and research into 
experiments and innovations in participatory governance. While advocates highlight 
the merits of such new governance arrangements in moving beyond traditional interest 
group representations and deepening democracy through deliberation with a broad 
range of civic associations, critics express concern about the political legitimacy and 
democratic accountability of participating associations, highlighting in particular the 
dangers of co-option and faction. Addressing these concerns, a number of theorists 
identify an important role for civic associations in linking deliberations at micro policy 
levels to those within the public sphere more broadly. These normative contributions 
raise an important empirical question—does civic associational engagement at micro 
levels leave scope to engage both laterally across associations and vertically with 
members and citizens more broadly? More simply put, is civic associational engagement 
within micro-policy fora “good” for democracy more broadly? Drawing from a study 
of civic associational engagement in Ireland’s national Social Partnership process over 
a ten-year period this article argues that, where deliberations become overshadowed 
by more traditional communicative norms of bargaining and negotiation, it is not. 
Evidence is presented from the Irish case to show how civic actors, having internalized 
the dominant communicative norms of the process, have contributed toward a 
narrowing of the deliberative space within, but most particularly outside, this process. 
This, it is argued, has resulted in a considerably weakened public sphere with neither the 
institutional apparatus nor the discursive capacity to seek accountability from political 
and civic leaders at a time of profound crisis within the Irish state.
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Over the past two decades there has been a burgeoning interest and research into 
experiments and innovations in governance at both local and national levels. Whether 
characterized as cogovernance,1 joined-up governance,2 multilevel governance,3 net-
work governance,4 or participatory governance,5 these innovative structures bring 
together the principal norms and tenets of both associative and deliberative democracy 
by opening the fields of policy to vertical and horizontal networks of civic associations 
while employing deliberation and iterative dialogue to achieve consensus. The spread 
of these new governance arrangements has been both wide and deep with innovations 
in participatory governance associated with both public sector reforms and “Third 
Way Politics” across the Western world,6 while similar arrangements underpin the 
good governance reforms of the 1990s in a wide range of developing countries.7
Advocates highlight the merits of these governance arrangements at both instrumen-
tal and political levels. Instrumentally, they are seen to lead to more effective policy as 
local partners and associations bring locally relevant information, analysis, and skills to 
the table.8 Moreover, the norms of deliberation employed in building shared understand-
ing are seen to build consensus, solidarity, and social stability,9 while the extension of the 
political space to a broader range of civic associations is described as deepening democ-
racy, moving beyond traditional interest group representations and deepening and 
extending the democratic state.10 These merits notwithstanding, concern has been 
expressed in relation to the perceived democratic deficit of these governance networks. 
While for some, the weak linkages between these new forms of governance and the 
formal institutions of representative democracy constitute an area of concern,11 others 
warn against the perils of both faction among12 and co-option of civic actors engaged in 
these processes.13 Issues of the democratic legitimacy and accountability of participating 
associations are therefore to the fore for skeptics and critics of such processes. Addressing 
these concerns, a number of theorists identify an important role for civic associations in 
linking deliberations at micro policy levels to those within the public sphere more 
broadly.14 Building on the work of Jane Mansbridge, who argues that elite deliberation 
must be supplemented with deliberation among “the rank and file” as “only citizens 
themselves can know what outcomes they want,”15 Caroline Hendriks proposes an “inte-
grated deliberative system” linking micro-level deliberations to a series of communica-
tive arenas fostering critical, public reflection.16 Independently of these theorists, Lucio 
Baccaro similarly argues that the legitimacy of micro governance arenas should be based 
on “their capacity to pass the test of collective scrutiny” within an active and mobilized 
public sphere.17 The agents of such mediation between sites of micro deliberation and 
the broad public are located by all theorists within civil society. Herein lies the dilemma 
however. While, in theory, civic associations represent a key mediation point between 
the broad public and the state, enhancing democracy through their participation across 
the deliberative system at both micro and macro levels and in the intervening spaces in 
between, in practice, their collective capacity to sustain engagement at all levels remains 
understudied. In an article examining the link between associational and neo-corporatist 
models, Lucio Baccaro poses the question succinctly.
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It is highly likely that modern democracies need both a civil society of the 
Habermasian kind, which controls from outside the formal structures of govern-
ment specialized in the resolution of practical problems, and a civil society of the 
associational democratic kind, which participates directly in problem-solving. 
What we need to understand at this point—and the question is not just theoreti-
cal but eminently empirical—is whether such duplicity of functions is sustain-
able: whether civil society is able to regenerate itself constantly and smoothly, so 
that for each organization that accedes to the bureaucratic circuit another emerges 
to take its place in the unstructured public sphere, or whether the transition of 
civil society associations from the “lifeworld” to the “system” of an enlarged 
bureaucracy (Habermas, 1987) does not deteriorate their capacity for critique and 
articulation of value-based alternatives.18
Through an examination of civic associational engagement within Ireland’s national 
Social Partnership process, a process variously characterized as a form of “network 
governance”19 and “an Irish version of Third Way politics,”20 this article interrogates 
this question more fully. The article employs an actor-oriented approach to analysis 
that focuses on the experiences, analyses, and perceptions of state and civic associational 
participants within the process. The findings presented draw on twenty-two interviews 
conducted from 2005 to 2007 with state and civic actors participating within the pro-
cess. These include representatives from eighteen of the twenty-three “community 
and voluntary” organizations involved as well as four of the most senior civil servants 
involved in deliberation, negotiation, and administration of the process.21 While this 
research was originally conducted as part of a broader research project comparing 
Ireland and Malawi’s processes as cases of globalised governance,22 a new analysis of 
the Irish data within the framework of deliberative theory—inspired by the rapidly 
changed Irish context—reveals important issues for deliberative actors and theorists 
alike. The research is complemented by an analysis of successive Social Partnership 
strategies and background policy documentation. The analysis presented highlights 
fundamental challenges posed by the superimposition of deliberation on more tradi-
tional communicative norms of bargaining and negotiation, and it is argued that civic 
actors, having internalized the dominant, more traditional communicative norms of 
the process, have contributed to a narrowing of the deliberative space within, but most 
particularly outside, this process. Over time, as an increasing number of national civic 
associations have entered the process, civil society outside has been left with little 
leadership to reanimate the public sphere. The result, it is argued, is a weakened public 
sphere with neither the institutional apparatus nor the discursive capacity to seek 
accountability from political and civic leaders at a time of profound crisis within the 
Irish state.
The argument is developed as follows. Within the context of an extensive literature 
examining the concurrence of Ireland’s Social Partnership process with the emergence 
of the economically vibrant “Celtic Tiger” economy of the 1990s, and given the massive 
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economic, social, and political crisis now facing the country and its people, the follow-
ing section argues the case for a reorientation in focus toward the implications of the 
process for substantive democracy within the country more broadly. This reorientation 
is next theorized through an examination of the normative ideals, critiques, and 
responses to these of the interrelated theories of associative and deliberative democ-
racy. The issues raised provide a framework for the third section wherein state and 
civic associational involvement in the Irish process is examined. Turning to Ireland’s 
deepening crisis, the article concludes with a discussion of the lessons—both of a prac-
tical and of a theoretical nature—drawn from the process.
Social Partnership: Ireland’s 
Experiment in Participatory Governance
Ireland’s Social Partnership began in the late 1980s in an effort to address the economic 
crisis then facing the country. Although initially developed around a solid corporatist 
core comprising capital, labor, farmers’ organizations (organized into three respective 
“pillars”), and the state to negotiate and agree on wage levels, thereby promoting 
industrial stability and a climate attractive to foreign investment, from the outset the 
process also included a wide range of nonpay aspects, including policies on tax reform, 
the evolution of welfare payments, trends in health spending, and structural adjust-
ments.23 Over the course of over twenty years, both the policy remit and the range 
of actors involved have increased substantially, moving the process a significant 
distance from its corporatist roots. The inclusion, in the mid-1990s, of a fourth pillar, 
the “community and voluntary pillar” (CV pillar), composing some seventeen national 
associational networks,24 described by the state as widening and deepening participation 
within the process,25 marked an important step in Ireland’s move toward participatory 
governance. A fifth “environmental pillar,” made up of twenty-seven environmental 
associations, joined the process in 2009. Both these pillars, composing national networks 
with extensive associational memberships throughout the country, have brought a large 
cross-section of civic associations into the Partnership process. Simultaneously, many 
of these same associations are engaged in parallel processes directly through locally 
based partnership structures—the principle model for policy making at local levels 
since the 1990s.26 The extent of the spread of participatory governance throughout the 
country, engaging community-based associations both directly and indirectly through 
their representative networks, raises an important question as to the impact (if any) of 
these processes on associational life across the country more broadly.
Notwithstanding the significant expansion and development of Social Partnership, 
analysis and commentary on the national process have, for the most part, centered on 
its function as an integral part of the country’s macroeconomic framework and, with a 
focus on the traditional core of state, labor, and unions, its role in building and consoli-
dating the “Celtic Tiger.” Opinion is divided within the literature between analysts 
who celebrate the process role in securing industrial stability, attracting foreign invest-
ment, and stimulating growth,27 and those who highlight the lack of socially progressive 
 at Dublin City University on September 16, 2013pas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Gaynor 501
outcomes,28 together with the growth in income inequality over the Social Partnership 
period.29 A comprehensive critique of the process as privileging capital over income 
equality and social justice comes from Kieran Allen,30 who focuses on the rise of the 
“working poor” and the role of trade unions in the process. Taking a more globalized 
perspective and drawing on Castells’s conception of the “network state,”31 elsewhere 
this author has argued that the process has functioned as an important political instru-
ment in expanding and consolidating a Gramscian integral state, nurturing and promot-
ing engagement across civil society more broadly in managing the social fallout accruing 
from the costs of the state’s project of global economic integration.32 To a lesser extent, 
some attention has also been directed at both the deliberative nature of the process 
(although this characterization remains somewhat vague and undertheorized)33 and, 
with weak linkages to the parliament and its institutions, its implications for (liberal) 
representative democracy.34
An area that has received far less attention from scholars and commentators how-
ever, and the focus of this article, is the political significance of the process more 
broadly, most notably in relation to its implications for broader macro deliberations 
within the public sphere and the health and vibrancy of associational life across the 
country. While a small group of theorists argue that civic associations have been co-
opted into the process, thereby failing to exert any real influence therein,35 these asser-
tions lack solid empirical bases, and we remain unclear as to why or how this may 
have happened (if indeed it has). At an empirical level, significant questions remain, 
therefore, in relation to the agency of civic associational networks within the CV pillar 
in the process.36 At a more theoretical level, the reality of participatory governance on 
the ground in many guises throughout the country, together with the high level of civic 
associational involvement this entails, provides a good case from which to interrogate 
normative proposals and suggestions for civic associational agency in linking macro 
and micro deliberative spheres. It is to these proposals and their significance in relation 
to Ireland’s national process that we now turn.
Associations, Deliberation, and Democracy:  
Theorizing Social Partnership
While many global commentators source the origins of partnership governance arrange-
ments within the discourse of the public reforms of the 1990s,37 with, as we have seen, 
scholars of the Irish process situating their analyses within labor relations theory, the 
emphasis on deliberation and consensus linked to the role ascribed to civic associations 
as state “partners” in economic and social development points to deeper linkages to 
both associative and deliberative democracy.
Although debates on the nature, role, and function of civil society broadly and civic 
associations more specifically date back to the seventeenth century,38 the 1990s brought 
about a vigorous revival in interest in the field, most notably in relation to the role of 
civic associations in democracy. Two key trends appear to have promoted this revival. 
The first is the role of civic associations worldwide in mobilizing the so-called “Third 
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Wave” of democracy that swept through Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa in 
the early 1990s, while the second is the context of falling voter turnout and growing 
apathy with liberal representative institutions in the West. Inspired by these develop-
ments, two broad schools of thought have emerged in relation to the role of associa-
tions and their relations with the state. The first envisages a civic associational space 
critical of and separate from both market and state, while the second, theorized most 
comprehensively as a model of “associative democracy,” envisages associations work-
ing in partnership with the state.
In one of the most significant contributions to the 1990s debate on the role of 
civic associations in democracy, Cohen and Arato advocate a model in which civic 
associations promote democracy through their animation of the public sphere, ensur-
ing vibrant debate and deliberation among civil society at large, with this, through 
association’s “dual role,” in turn feeding into political deliberations and decision 
making at more formal levels.39 The authors draw heavily on Habermas’s notion of a 
“communicative/discourse ethics” wherein the public sphere is depicted as a site of 
rational critical deliberation among free and equal citizens employing deliberative 
norms that are inclusive, reasoned and reflective, and aimed at reaching common 
understanding and consensus.40 Habermas argues that unconstrained communication 
is made possible by civil society organizations that periodically renew the political 
debate and force the official circuits of power to be attentive and responsive to new 
issues arising at the periphery of the system. Following Habermas, for Cohen and 
Arato, “The political role of civil society in turn is not directly related to the control or 
conquest of power but to the generation of influence through the life of democratic 
associations and unconstrained discussion in the cultural public sphere.”41 The role of 
civic associations, following this conception, is to open up public spaces for more 
inclusive, broader deliberation and debate on issues of public interest and concern.
While this conception invokes a deliberative space open to all, it is not without its 
critics, for whom Habermas and his followers deliver an overly rationalist conception 
of the public sphere that, despite claims that it makes room for difference, fails to 
adequately theorize pluralism and power. Specifically, critics argue that the norms of 
rational discourse with their deliberative emphasis on communicative reason and con-
sensus ignore the pluralist and inevitably conflictual nature of society,42 and exclude 
individuals and groups for whom more emotive, less bounded, and less rational forms 
of communication are the norm,43 thus reinforcing and reproducing existing exclusions 
and inequalities as powerful actors come to dominate the public sphere.44 The influence 
of these different critiques on deliberative theory is apparent in recent work with theo-
rists, appreciating the legitimacy of differing opinions and positions, advocating more 
pluralist conceptions of the public sphere (see, e.g., Benhabib’s argument that a civic 
perspective of “enlarged mentality” suffices in the absence of consensus,45 or Dryzek 
and Niemeyer’s proposed concept of “meta-consensus,” which recognizes the legiti-
macy of different values and positions).46 Thus, contemporary debates, cognizant of the 
multiplicity of positions and proposals, envisage a role for civic associations in animat-
ing the public sphere in a way that ensures that communications are not distorted by 
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powerful voices and interests and that a diversity of positions, interests, and perspec-
tives are expressed.
The second major contribution to the debate on associations and democracy advo-
cates a model where associations work in partnership with the state in a more formal 
deliberative role in the arena of economic and social policy and service delivery. Several 
variants on this model have been proposed. Hirst’s proposal is for a radical transforma-
tion of public and private spheres whereby the state cedes key economic and social 
functions to civic associations,47 with civic associations, following this conception, 
playing a role in both policy formulation and implementation in partnership with, 
although autonomous to, the state. Cohen and Rogers’s recommendations for a closer 
relationship between associations and states to address the shortcomings of the welfare 
state resonate with those proposed by Hirst.48 In line with the instrumental arguments 
of governance proponents, Cohen and Rogers argue that associations can help improve 
policy formulation and implementation by leveraging local knowledge, encouraging 
compliance to policy, and monitoring outcomes. Fung and Wright propose a third vari-
ant on this theme. Their proposals for what they call empowered participatory gover-
nance (EPG) see associations pushing for institutional reforms wherein individuals 
may directly participate with state actors in deliberation and policy formulation at 
local levels. The benefits of such arrangements, they argue, are reciprocal, with asso-
ciations providing channels for individual voices, while the direct opportunities to 
influence policy and state action create incentives for individuals to create and main-
tain associations.49
In Ireland, the key government policy document setting out the relationship of the 
state to civic associations reflects strongly these basic principles of associative democ-
racy. Within this document, the state is described as “not the answer to every problem, 
but just one player among others,” with the government’s vision of society described 
as being “one which encourages people and communities to look after their own 
needs—very often in partnership with statutory agencies—but without depending on 
the state to meet all needs.” Thus, policies and action priorities should be based on 
local knowledge and, in line with the proposals of a number of associative democrats, 
the Irish government recommends that the contribution of associations to policy and 
service provision be supported financially.50
As with the first model discussed, a number of problems with these normative asso-
ciative models have been identified. These may be summarized into the “what” and the 
“who” of representation within these formal, micro-level deliberative fora. The “what” 
problem raises questions regarding which issues to include and how to deliberate on 
these. Both Schmitter and Young are sharply critical of European models of associative 
democracy in that, they argue, only distributional issues are included, with all other 
nonmaterialist issues remaining exempt.51 The “who” problem relates to the “faction” 
problem common within traditional interest group politics—that of incomplete repre-
sentation and self-serving behavior. As in traditional interest group politics, civic asso-
ciations are likely to represent the specific interests of their members, and not those of 
society more broadly. Two aspects of this problem are of particular concern here. First, 
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there is the problem of equality of representation. Well-resourced groups coalescing 
around specific issues are generally more powerful and therefore more successful in 
attaining their interests than more marginalized groupings with broader concerns. As 
Fung notes, “In political science and political sociology, group research has consistently 
shown that ‘the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with an 
upper class accent.’”52 And second, as Hirst and Bader note, civic associations as self-
governing entities may withdraw from the wider community they purport to represent, 
seeking to control their members through the services that they provide—a problem 
of oligarchy and a lack of internal democracy.53 Far from meditating and representing 
members’ interests, associations may become institutions of social control.
Cohen and Rogers, recognizing that all associations may not automatically be 
“public spirited,” propose two solutions. First, they envisage a level of state interven-
tion to curb factional interests and centralize and stimulate “a deliberate politics of 
association” to equalize interest representation or make associations more public spir-
ited or “other-regarding.”54 Thus, states may intervene to ensure accountability of group 
leadership to members, the representativeness (or “encompassingness” as they term it) 
of the group relative to affected populations and their modes of interaction with other 
groups—by selecting the civic actors to be involved. Second, Cohen and Rogers,55 
together with a number of other theorists,56 highlight the importance of linking delib-
erations at micro policy levels with those at more macro levels within the public sphere 
more broadly.
Associations therefore in theory represent a key mediation point between the broad 
public and the state, enhancing democracy through their participation across the delib-
erative system. At a micro, formal level, they can represent the interests, ideas, analy-
ses, and positions of “the people” affected by particular policy processes and decisions. 
At a macro, informal level, they can facilitate public deliberation by opening the space 
for a diversity of voices, views, interests, and positions. And in the intervening spaces 
in between, they can improve the quality and equality of political representation by 
making the link between informal and formal arenas, opening channels for individuals 
to hold their political leaders accountable, mobilize where necessary, and press their 
public concerns. The key question is, to what extent do civic associations succeed in 
promoting such deliberation across these multiple fora? Or more specifically, does 
their engagement at a micro level leave scope to engage laterally across associations 
and vertically with members and citizens more broadly?
This question is explored below through an examination of the CV pillar’s engage-
ment in Ireland’s national Social Partnership process.
Deliberation and Democracy 
within Ireland’s Social Partnership
As we have seen, the shift to a more associative model within Ireland’s national Social 
Partnership process formally came about in 1996 when, following some pressure from 
a number of civic interest groups, the Irish state invited eight civic networks into the 
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process to form a new “community and voluntary pillar.”57 While some networks had 
applied to be involved,58 others were invited. Networks targeted for invitation by the 
state were key umbrella groups for particular sectors with sizeable constituencies of 
interest.59 The Community Workers Cooperative (CWC), interested in gaining 
broader-based representation, went on to form the Community Platform, an amalgam 
of initially seventeen small national associations (although membership has fluctuated 
up and down over time).
Notwithstanding their commonalities as key national civic associational networks 
with wide membership bases, from the outset there were clear differences between 
participant groups. First, there were divisions between issue-based/single-constituency 
groups focused on securing specific policy gains and broader-based groups interested 
in engaging in more open deliberative dialogue with other participants. Specifically, 
with a doubling of EU Structural Funds in 1989, leading to a total investment in Ireland 
over the period 1989 to 1999 of 11 billion euros,60 for a number of interest-based asso-
ciations, engagement in the process was about “shaping the social agenda and where 
resources are going to be placed,”61 while for others it was more about opening up 
dialogue and debate. Second, there were divisions between welfare-type approaches to 
social inclusion focusing solely on distributional issues, as advocated by particular 
religious associations, and associations aiming for broader structural change. Third, 
there were also divisions in relation to communication norms, with some associations 
from the outset stressing a rational, “professional” approach in the Habermasian sense, 
yet others favoring wider methods of communication including protest and contesta-
tion. And fourth, although many participant associations worked through extensive 
constituent networks composing hundreds of locally based associations, there were 
clear differences in relation to the size and capacity of participant groups at national 
level. The average estimate of human resource requirements for participation within 
the process is one person full-time,62 with this intensifying during negotiation periods 
leading up to agreement on final strategies. While some organizations employed 
one or two dedicated policy officers, others employed just one or two staff overall. 
Participation in the process thus drew heavily on limited resources, and many civic 
participants noted that ties with their constituencies have suffered as a consequence 
of the exigencies of participation in the process.
As we have seen, for advocates of participatory or network governance the key 
benefits for the state include more effective policies together with increased social 
cohesion and stability. While senior state officials appear somewhat ambivalent in 
relation to the policy expertise of participant associations, there is no doubt that their 
engagement has brought a legitimacy to both the process and its outcomes. And with 
associational networks extending throughout the country at local level, this legitimacy 
has the potential to reach far and wide. As a senior state official involved notes, “. . . 
[T]here is an aspect of legitimacy which derives from their [civic associations’] 
involvement. In a sense, the concern with fairness in the broader sense in the agreement 
is a good element to have in terms of the wider public understanding and acceptance 
of the outcomes of these negotiations. . . . We would have found restructuring the 
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economy much more problematic, much more conflictual, much less successful with-
out it.”63
The Social Partnership model therefore, as conceived by both state and civic actors 
at the outset, represented a hybrid of both associative democratic and corporatist mod-
els. Its associative democratic influences are apparent in both the state’s and civic 
actors’ own “selection” of a diverse range of associations, while the state’s particular 
focus on sectoral interest-based or single-issue groups belies its corporatist roots, 
increasing the scope for faction. Of particular interest in this article is the nature and 
quality of deliberation within and without the process and its impact on faction among 
participant associations.
Deliberation within Social Partnership
As we have seen, one of the key features of deliberation is its potential to address, 
to some degree, the problem of faction by facilitating a sharing of views and a trans-
formation of preferences. The aim is to build shared understandings, solidarity, and 
consensus on policy direction moving forward. However, within this section we see 
that Ireland’s Social Partnership process, through its institutional design, its dominant 
communicative norms, and its pressure to reach consensus across diverse civic inter-
est groups, mitigates against this, with problems of both faction and deliberation 
increasing over time.
The Social Partnership process comprises both a range of sectoral pillars and a 
complex set of institutions, both formal and informal—each with overlapping but spe-
cific remits feeding into the final policy strategy. Pillar members are expected to work 
with colleagues within their own pillar to produce consensus policy proposals and 
positions. Pillar representatives then present and promote these at different fora within 
the process. At a broad level, the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) is the 
institution that brings together up to fifteen invited representatives from the CV pillar 
together with fifteen representatives from each of the other pillars as well as a variable 
number of parliamentary representatives and independent specialists to deliberate on 
and provide input on reports in broad areas of social inclusion that may inform rele-
vant policy on an ongoing basis. Since its inception in 1993, the NESF has produced 
thirty-nine reports on different areas of social policy. In March 2010, the institution 
was amalgamated into the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). The NESC, 
in operation since 1973 and therefore predating Social Partnership, is identified by all 
actors as the pivotal institution in the process as this, the state’s principal advisory 
body, is responsible for producing a strategy document that sets out the parameters 
under which the subsequent negotiation and bargaining phase is conducted. Composing 
a subset of participants from each of the pillars (five representatives from each), the 
NESC is designed to provide an open deliberative space aimed at reaching what its 
director describes as a “shared understanding” on key economic and social issues 
drawing on inputs from its participants. In recent years the NESC has focused on 
addressing the growing crisis in social services that accompanied the period of rapid 
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economic growth through a problem-solving approach with social partners. In parallel 
with this key forum, pillar members meet separately within their own pillar to analyze 
and prepare joint positions on and responses to draft papers emanating from the NESC 
secretariat. The frequency and intensity of both NESC and pillar meetings increase 
considerably in the months leading up to the final bilateral negotiations between pillar 
members and state representatives. This third official stage of the process, referred to 
by all as the “negotiation” phase, is where deliberation ceases and pillar representa-
tives engage in separate bilateral, intensive negotiations with state officials in attempts 
to maximize policy (and budgetary) outcomes. It is at this point that the corporatist 
wage and tax deals are negotiated with employer and union pillars while separate civic 
actors’ negotiations focus solely on the core aspects of social policy set out in the 
NESC strategy. This negotiation phase can take anything from a number of weeks to a 
number of months as the classic instruments of bargaining and negotiation come into 
play. In parallel to these official fora, ad hoc unofficial meetings also take place 
between strategic actors and state officials in efforts to progress specific organizations’ 
interests. Table 1 synopsizes the purpose and composition of these main fora.
Within the context of these multiple fora, four features of the process have served 
in particular to increase factional politics and self-serving behavior among civic actors 
over time with the result that interest-based politics has tended to trump deliberation 
as time has evolved. The first is the fact that, with both the NESF and NESC compos-
ing a select number of representatives of each pillar and the final phase negotiations 
taking place on a bilateral basis through the so-called “separate rooms” mechanism, 
the opportunities for face-to-face deliberations across all pillars are rare. As Table 1 
illustrates, the only opportunity for all participants from all pillars to come together is 
during the quarterly plenaries (which in reality are reported as happening once to twice 
a year). These meetings are described by participants as “largely set pieces” where 
formal speeches are delivered with little or no opportunity for cross-deliberations. Civic 
actors report that most of their time has been spent in meetings with counterparts within 
their own pillar negotiating agreed pillar positions rather than deliberating with other 
actors. With meetings with members of other pillars rare, and competition for places 
within other fora (together with all-important informal bilateral meetings with state 
officials) fierce, opportunities and incentives to work toward shared understandings 
and transform preferences across sectoral interests are reported to have been few.
The second related feature is the requirement that the CV pillar produce consensus 
positions and proposals on a wide range of social policy issues. These consensus posi-
tions are then brought forward by a select number of pillar representatives to different 
institutions within the process (e.g., the NESC, the formal bilateral meetings, or vari-
ous working committees). With members seeking to push their own particular sectoral 
interests, civic actors report that most of their time has been spent “negotiating within 
the pillar” in an effort to push their particular agendas as well as secure places within 
other key fora. The time commitment for engagement within the pillar alone has been 
significant, and as we will see, the pressures to reach consensus have led to growing 
antagonism and conflict within the pillar over time.
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Table 1. Social Partnership Institutions, Their Purpose, and Their Participants
Institution Participants Purpose
National Economic and Social 
Forum (NESF)—established 
in 1993—meetings are 
ongoing  
Up to fifteen reps from CV pillar 
(generally variable)
To deliberate on and draw up 
reports in broad areas of social 
inclusion that may inform 
relevant policy  
Fifteen reps from each of three 
other strands—Parliament, 
employer–trade union farmer, 
and central–local government–
independents, respectively
NESF staff
National Economic and 
Social Council (NESC)—
established in 1973—
meetings are ongoing   
Five reps from CV pillar To deliberate on and draw up 
the strategy that sets the 
parameters for the subsequent 
negotiations   
NESC staff
Two reps from prime minister’s 
department
Ten government nominees
Negotiations leading to fourth 
strategy, Partnership 2000 
(happened in 1997)
All CV pillar members meet in 
a “separate room” with state 
officials who also meet separately 
with members of other pillars
To negotiate social policy 
commitments for inclusion in 
the subsequent strategy
Negotiations leading to fifth 
strategy, Programme for 
Prosperity and Fairness 
(happened in 2000)
All CV pillar members meet in 
a “separate room” with state 
officials who also meet separately 
with members of other pillars
To negotiate social policy 
commitments for inclusion in 
the subsequent strategy
Negotiations leading to sixth 
strategy, Sustaining Progress 
(happened in 2003)
All CV pillar members meet in 
a “separate room” with state 
officials who also meet separately 
with members of other pillars
To negotiate social policy 
commitments for inclusion in 
the subsequent strategy
Negotiations leading to 
seventh strategy, Towards 
2016 (happened in 2006)
All CV pillar members (including 
nine new members)
To negotiate social policy 
commitments for inclusion in 
the subsequent strategy
Monitoring Committee/
Steering Group (post-2003)
Five reps of the CV pillar Regular meetings (every one 
to three months) to track 
implementation of Social 
Partnership agreements
Bilateral meetings with 
key state officials (ad 
hoc unofficial meetings 
determined by officials)
Representatives of specific 
associations—as agreed by state 
officials
To input to specific policies in line 
with sectoral interests
Quarterly plenaries (nominally 
every three months, 
generally happen less 
frequently)
All members of CV pillar meet with 
all members of other pillars
Formal sessions where state 
reports on progress of 
agreement
Other policy fora and working 
committees (increasingly 
all national-level policy 
processes have been linked 
to Social Partnership)
Very variable—representatives 
either elected by CV pillar 
members or invited by state 
officials
To give input on state policy in 
specific areas—some directly 
arising from SP agreement, 
others formed directly by state
CV pillar = community and voluntary pillar.
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A third feature is the communication norms promoted throughout the process, 
together with the range of issues up for discussion. The corporatist roots of the process 
have already been noted. While Ireland’s process has been described as combining a 
mix of bargaining, negotiation, and deliberation,64 as we have seen, the deliberative 
component is largely restricted to the NESF and NESC fora, while traditional corporat-
ist norms of bargaining and negotiation dominate the all-important later phase. This is 
apparent from the naming of this latter phase, the “negotiations,” as well as from par-
ticipants descriptions of communication being “hard-nosed” and “macho,” navigable 
by “playing hardball” in “a kind of culture of negotiations that suits the unions” but not 
all civic actors.65 As one of the senior state officials notes, “It always comes down to 
deal-making . . . this is about the craft of negotiation, deal-making. . . . You either can 
do it or you can’t.”66
A fourth feature of the process, again revealing its corporatist underpinnings, is the 
decision-making process, which, largely taking place within informal, hidden arenas, is 
characterized by one civic actor as a mechanism of “horse-trading.”67 Civic actors are 
under no illusions as to their distance from the decision-making processes. As another 
notes, “Don’t make any mistake. We all bid in our stuff, but the scribes are in [the 
Department of] an Taoiseach’s,68 or in whatever Department, or with influence from 
other places. So what comes back to you as a draft is their hand with never enough of 
what you’ve put in.”69 All civic actors note that the decisions are made elsewhere, in 
other rooms, with other actors.
These key features of the process have, over time, combined to produce a heady mix 
of frustration, antagonism, and animosity among and between civic actors. While civic 
actors note that an interest in building solidarity and shaping a social agenda together 
was certainly a feature at the outset in the mid-1990s—most particularly for the CWC, 
which formed a broader-based Community Platform with this in mind—their appetite 
for collective work has certainly waned over time and increased fragmentation rather 
than cohesion has come to characterize the civic pillar, with factional politics now pre-
dominating. Both state and civic actors’ responses to an inevitable split within the pillar 
in 2003 following a particularly difficult round of negotiations reflect a hardening in 
attitudes and a narrowing of communicative norms both within and outside of the 
process.
Following the publication of the 2003 agreement, both the Community Platform—
led by the Community Worker’s Cooperative—and the National Women’s Council 
of Ireland (NWCI) publicly refused to endorse it on the basis that it offered nothing 
to their respective constituencies. While there has never been a formal ratification 
requirement for Social Partnership agreements, both the term itself (agreement as 
opposed to strategy) and the unwritten codes of conduct that surround it imply endorse-
ment of resultant strategies by all. The Platform and NWCI’s rejection of the 2003 
agreement (or nonagreement as it thus was), although they attracted sparse media cover-
age and failed to generate wider public debate on either the process or the issues, 
nonetheless appear to have perturbed both the state and remaining CV pillar members 
alike in that, signaling what Mouffe would regard as false consensus,70 it undermined 
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the legitimacy of both the process and its participants. This is evidenced in the conse-
quences for the dissenting parties who were, in their own words, “severely punished,” 
by state and remaining CV pillar members alike.
This punishment took two forms. First, dissenting associations were removed by 
the state from the process. Having lost their social partner status, they then found 
themselves ostracized not just from fora relating to the partnership process, but from 
a wide range of other policy fora also (e.g., consultative committees on specific social 
policy issues, bilateral meetings with officials). It was becoming clear to civic actors 
that Social Partnership had become the gateway into all other national-level policy 
fora, whether formally linked to the process or not. Moreover, dissenting parties found 
themselves isolated, not just by state actors but by remaining civic participants them-
selves, being denied access to or information on policy developments by their own 
colleagues. As one civic representative notes, “. . . [W]hat’s interesting is that some of 
the groups that stayed in the [CV] pillar . . . would be even more punitive than the state 
itself, more exclusionary than the state itself.”71 And second, their core state funding 
and hence survival were jeopardized. Following the Cohen and Rogers’s model, many 
civic associations in Ireland are predominantly state funded. In 2005 this state funding 
accounted for 74.5 percent of nonprofit organizational income.72 Following its rejec-
tion of the 2003 agreement, all state funding to the CWC was cut, resulting in the loss 
of two out of four of its staff. In contrast, two existing and one new CV pillar member 
received once-off grants of between 50,000 and 250,000 euros in both 2003 and 
2004.73 From 2006 on, funding of 10 million euros per annum has been made available 
to CV pillar members for “costs arising from contributing to evidence-based policy 
making, over and above normal activities and programmes.”74 Facing financial chal-
lenges and left in something of a policy wilderness, both the NWCI and the Community 
Platform, led once more by the CWC, in early 2007 agreed to rejoin the process. Both 
were promised 55,000 euros per annum state funding for their participation. In addi-
tion, at the state’s invite, nine other sectoral associations joined the civic pillar in 
2007, and an additional pillar composing twenty-seven environmental associations 
was created in 2009.
Clearly the stakes are high, and the pressures to conform to the narrow communica-
tive parameters of the process and retain or regain social partner status are consider-
able. This is not lost on remaining civic actors, who, despite growing factionalism and 
a loss in appetite for cooperation, appear determined to present a rational, consensual 
front. A disciplining (in a Foucauldian sense) element has entered the pillar, where 
there is no longer any room for groups not committed to a problem-solving discourse 
employing what have become the normative communicative methods of “reasonable” 
evidenced-based argumentation. Any other communicative approach, as articulated by 
one new pillar member below, is now perceived as knocking the process, dragging 
down pillar members, and demonstrating a lack of respect for the process and its par-
ticipants. “I suppose I have no difficulty for any organizations coming in once they’re 
coming in for the right reasons, and not to knock the whole process and not to drag us 
all down. . . . It’s a lot about attitude as well of people. I think the Community and 
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Voluntary Platform could make a very positive role in partnership once it doesn’t try 
to unbalance the respect that we’ve built up.”75
This determination to present a professional, consensual front notwithstanding, 
factional politics prevails, and the appetite for collective, cooperative engagement has 
certainly dissipated. A number of civic representatives now speak of expending far 
less energy on trying to work collectively. One representative, reflecting on evolving 
relations within the pillar, puts it succinctly: “Because I think it’s very clear, as much 
as we are democratic within the pillar, as much as we have worked to make a pillar 
position, this is not a consensus game. This is not a cooperation game. Every one of 
the fifteen of us is out for our own agenda and we really couldn’t give a hoot about the 
others.”76
Thus, the civic pillar, following some ten years of engagement in the process, 
emerges as a somewhat more homogenous entity, rational and professional in conduct 
yet determined to unilaterally fight for rather than change specific sectoral prefer-
ences. Clearly this has had significant implications for deliberations within the 
process—but what of deliberations and engagements with constituents and citizens 
more broadly in a more integrated deliberative system as advocated by contemporary 
theorists?
Deliberation outside of Social Partnership
With an increasing number of civic networks entering the process in recent years, it is 
particularly striking that the level of public debate and scrutiny of the process and its 
civic actors has declined significantly. While the process received considerable atten-
tion in its earlier years, with civic actors engaging media specialists to gain coverage 
in the national media and raise debate within the public sphere in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the dearth of media coverage and public debate on the CV pillars’ con-
tributions during and beyond the 2006 deliberations stands in marked contrast to these 
earlier years. This is due to the norm of confidentiality that increasingly imbues the 
process. As a senior state official notes, “I suppose we would also expect . . . a degree 
of observance of the no surprises principle,”77 meaning that everything should be dealt 
with internally rather than generating any external debate on relevant issues. This has 
clearly been communicated in subtle ways to participants.
There’s definitely a confidentiality anyway and I suppose you have to monitor 
that reasonably as well. There’s probably a level of discretion. But there’s also 
a spirit of the agreement, or a spirit of Social Partnership, which says . . . “we’d 
rather you talk to us than go public.” Or they [state officials] may not say it, but 
you’ll know it from body language, people not returning your calls, people being 
snotty.78
Thus, the communicative norms within the process have had a significant impact 
on deliberations within the broader public sphere. With practically all of the main 
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nationally based civic networks now engaged or, in some cases, reengaged in the pro-
cess, and with norms of confidentiality actively promoted by state and civic actors 
alike, the public space for reflection, debate, and critical scrutiny has been considerably 
weakened. This is exacerbated by the weak linkages between many civic actors and 
their own constituencies as they report that the exigencies of the negotiations and delib-
erations within the process have drawn on their limited resources. Indeed, it is notewor-
thy that, when questioned in 2007 about their lack of media work, a number of members 
of the civic pillar regarded the media as a lobbying tool, rather than as a mechanism for 
mobilizing popular debate. Thus it was deemed important to use it judiciously so as not 
to “upset” colleagues in the process. In the words of one pillar member, “. . . [Y]ou need 
to be careful not to use [the media] too often. One, you upset the other organizations in 
the negotiations if you don’t manage it right. Two, you upset the civil servants. . . . You 
need to be careful.”79
It would appear that, contrary to the norms of the integrated deliberative system 
advocated by a number of deliberative theorists, as increasing numbers of associations 
enter the micro-level policy circuit and both internalize and promote its narrow com-
municative norms among coactors and constituent networks alike, civic associational 
agency within the public sphere is increasingly impoverished and the space for scrutiny, 
critique, and the articulation of alternatives all but shut down. In codependent relation-
ships with the state—both financially and in terms of their increasingly specialized 
policy remit, and with little support from a considerably weakened public sphere, civic 
associations appear to have little choice but to remain inside. This has led to a sclero-
sis both in the process itself and in governance and democracy more broadly, raising 
important questions in relation to the overall democratic viability of the process.
Conclusion—The Politics of Deliberative Democracy
September 29, 2008, is a date now etched into the mind of every Irish citizen. On this 
date, with neither public nor parliamentary consultation, a handful of senior state 
officials signed a blanket guarantee to transfer the rapidly rising debt of all Irish pri-
vately owned banks to the public. As the bailout costs escalated (current estimates put 
the final cost at 5 billion euros [$7.1 billion], although the ultimate limit is anybody’s 
guess) and a budget crisis loomed, again with neither public or parliamentary consulta-
tion, on November 29, 2010, officials signed a structural adjustment loan of 85 billion 
euros ($12.2 billion) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European 
Central Bank (ECB) to cover immediate costs of the bailout. The quid pro quo is a 
commitment to public expenditure cuts totaling 10 billion euros ($14.3 billion) 
together with tax hikes to the tune of 5 billion euros ($7.1 billion).
Spectacular as these events and figures appear, possibly the most remarkable aspect 
in all of this—and one noted by a number of international onlookers—has been the 
paucity of both debate and action within the public sphere in the face of such devastation. 
Michael Lewis, writing in early 2011 that “[f]or two years [the Irish people] have 
laboured under this impossible burden with scarcely a peep of protest,”80 highlights 
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the stark contrast of the Irish public’s reaction to that of the Greek and Icelandic people. 
Indeed, the only notable expression of public anger remains somewhat ambivalent—a 
replacement of one center-right coalition with another in national elections held in 
February 2011. Why the apparent passivity? Is it that the Irish public does not under-
stand what has happened, what their political leaders have foisted on them? Far from it. 
With public discourse—within the media and beyond—dominated by talk of interna-
tional markets, subordinated debt, and capital flight, the public has become expert in the 
vagaries and nuances of the international bond markets. However, in the absence of 
alternative discourses, voices, and interests across this same public sphere, appeasing 
the international markets is the only option, the sole focus. The diversity of positions, 
interests, and opinions central to contemporary theorists’ conception of the public sphere 
is glaring by its absence. This stands in marked contrast to the relatively vibrant public 
sphere of the 1970s and 1980s, which, animated by community housing groups in urban 
areas together with vibrant women’s movement more broadly, infused the public sphere 
with the language of class, gender, and wider power relations.81
It may appear something of a leap to attribute this narrowing of the public sphere 
to the relative invisibility of a once vocal and vibrant network of civic associations and 
indeed even more of a leap to suggest that their accession to the micro policy sphere 
of Social Partnership is a factor in any of this.82 However difficult this may be to prove 
conclusively, the analysis presented in this article does point to the role of the process 
in narrowing the deliberative public sphere, thereby, at a broader level, highlighting 
some fundamental challenges in the translation of the ideals of deliberative and asso-
ciative democratic theory into practice. Underpinning these is the fact that “new” gov-
ernance processes do not arrive into political vacuums—either institutional or cultural. 
And clearly politics matters. There are some useful lessons here for deliberative pro-
ponents and theorists.
First, while associative models certainly do offer the potential to improve policy 
and, by extension, social outcomes for particular groups, in the context of a traditionally 
integral Gramscian state with a strong tradition and experience of corporatist models, 
associative models also afford states opportunities to consolidate their legitimacy and 
support for specific policies and programs through complex lateral and horizontal 
associational networks.
Second, in this same context where communication norms of bargaining and nego-
tiation prevail, it may not be possible to introduce deliberation. Or indeed, what is 
termed deliberation may in fact be something else. Certainly, the failure of the Irish 
process to accommodate contestation and a plurality of communicative modes within 
many if not all its institutions raises questions about the degree to which it may be char-
acterized as deliberative at all. This in turn leads to questions as to its in/exclusivity. 
Indeed, is it possible to superimpose or graft deliberative processes onto preexisting 
models?
Third, the problem of faction has been highlighted throughout the case study. In 
the context of a strong Gramscian state such as that seen here, Cohen and Rogers’s 
proposals for state intervention as a means of increasing equality of representation to 
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address factional issues make little sense. Greater equality and diversity in civic asso-
ciational engagement will lead only to more complex, messy, and conflictual delibera-
tions, making securing wider public support all the more difficult. On the other hand, 
as students of politics the world over are only too well aware, financial support begets 
political support. Within the narrow policy and financial constraints of contemporary 
state–associational relations, it makes little sense for civic partners to bite the hand that 
feeds them. Moreover, with a weakened public sphere where the actions of state and 
civic associations alike proceed largely unremarked upon, there is clearly little incentive 
to do so.
This brings us back to the question posed at the beginning of the article—does civic 
associational engagement at micro levels leave scope to engage laterally across asso-
ciations and vertically with members and citizens thereby sustaining a vibrant, active 
public sphere? Is civic associational engagement within micro-policy fora “good” for 
democracy in a substantive sense? The answer to this has to be a qualified “it depends.” 
As the Irish case has shown, it depends on the nature of the state and its development 
project; it depends on its relations with civic actors across all spheres; it depends on the 
discursive and communicative norms allowed within micro fora; it depends on the 
interests, motivations, and actions of civic actors involved; and most particularly, it 
depends on how civic participants within micro fora interact with their peers and coun-
terparts without. Whatever the answer, the question is an extremely important one. In the 
Irish case, civic engagement within Social Partnership appears to have eroded democ-
racy. At a broader level, as the political and economic contagion that was borne in a 
period of participatory governance spreads throughout the Western world, it is perhaps 
time to reassess the democratic viability of participatory governance institutions and 
arrangements globally, turning our attention to the ways in which contemporary politi-
cal and civic leadership may be reinvigorated, recharged, and rendered more account-
able to and representative of society at large.
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